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Too Much Information: Predictions of
Employee Disease and the Fringe Benefit
System
Lance Liebmant
Two themes of iecent American labor policy are at odds with
each other. One is the expansive concept of antidiscrimination,1
now in process of being applied to tell employers that certain pre-
dicted disadvantages of job applicants should be ignored when hir-
ing decisions are made.2 The second is the equally expansive idea
of social protection as an employer responsibility, now in process of
assigning to employers a much larger responsibility for the eco-
nomic needs of workers and their families. Testing-the effort by
employers to discover information about applicants and employ-
ees-is at the intersection of these policies and at the center of the
conflict. As advances in medical science and technology expand the
universe of qualities and characteristics for which employees can
be tested, this conflict becomes increasingly difficult to resolve.
This paper considers one likely consequence of our rapid advances
in medical science and technology: The increased ability to predict
disease (and perhaps behavior itself) among job applicants. Does
current antidiscrimination law bar employers from basing hiring
decisions on predictions of future disease? Should it? On one hand,
we as a society have a poorly articulated sense that consideration
of such factors is inappropriate; on the other hand, state and fed-
eral legislation is heightening the economic relevance of those very
factors.
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I was assisted by the work of Harvard law
students, some of whom wrote excellent papers of their own on aspects of these issues:
Danny Eaton, Peter Fossett, Wendy Kornreich, Paul Louis Myers, Morris Panner, Eileen
Penner, and Peter Waters.
See, for example, Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Pro-
motion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91 (1966): "Once loosed, the idea of Equality is
not easily cabined."
" A related theme is that employers should be denied certain information about current
and prospective workers-the appropriate protection for worker liberty includes freedom
from employer concern with important aspects of the worker's person and behavior.
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I. EMPLOYERS AND WORKER SELECTION
Over the past quarter-century, government has intervened in-
creasingly in employer hiring decisions. Much of this intervention
has taken the form of official restrictions on the acquisition or use
of information by employers when they are choosing new workers.
The antidiscrimination crusade, begun with enactment of Title VII
in 1964,1 has been an assault on illegitimate selection standards,
especially those having an exclusionary impact on protected cate-
gories of applicants.
In this same quarter-century, employer investment in worker
selection has increased mightily. Some of this increase is a re-
sponse by employers to the new legal environment. Employers may
collect more data in an effort to avoid or win discrimination law-
suits. They may do so in response to judicial retreat from doctrines
of at-will employment: When law and social practice make dismis-
sal more difficult, additional care may be taken in selection. They
may be more careful in hiring because of expanded employer liabil-
ity to third parties resulting from employee acts or omissions. And
finally, they may be reacting to a phenomenon discussed below:
The increase in employer responsibility for various aspects of an
employee's personal life.4 Other causes are not legal. For example,
with intensive capital investment, it may be dangerous to let the
wrong worker too close to an expensive and fragile machine.
Whatever the causes, the employee selection business is boom-
ing; sophisticated tests of personality and character are common;
millions of lie detector tests5 and drug tests are given annually to
prospective employees; and other forms of medical and biological
tests are in wide use.'
Genetics, the branch of natural science now undergoing the
most dramatic ferment, has suddenly become relevant to the hiring
system. Since Watson and Crick elucidated the structure of deox-
' Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e (1982).
4 See text at notes 106-113.
' See Note, Lie Detectors in the Workplace: The Need for Civil Actions Against Em-
ployers, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 806 (1988) (two million lie detector tests annually to current or
prospective employees).
' See Deborah A. Stone, The Resistible Rise of Preventative Medicine, 11 J. of Health
Pol., Pol'y, & L. 671, 683 (1986). Professor Stone refers to an HEW survey finding that 83.3
percent of employees in large firms (over 500 workers) received pre-employment medical
exams. She also cites an OTA study on likely increases in genetic screening. See also Labor
Letter, Wall St. J. 1 (Dec. 29, 1987): "Toyota... has raised the eye-brows of some personnel
consultants by putting every applicant for a new auto-assembly plant in Georgetown, Ky.,
through prolonged examinations. Even hopefuls for entry-level shop-floor jobs are tested for
14 hours."
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yribonucleic acid (DNA) in 1954, steady and sometimes revolution-
ary advances have occurred. In time, these gains in knowledge will
affect many aspects of human life: Sources of food, childbirth, dis-
ease, and the process of aging. Currently, genetic tests can predict
certain diseases in high risk groups: Huntington's disease, cystic
fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, and polycystic kidney dis-
ease. Soon, there are likely to be genetic tests to predict risk of a
number of other diseases: Familial Alzheimer's disease, malignant'
melanoma, breast cancer, and even manic depression. Some em-
ployers have already begun to use genetic tests on their
workforces.7
As an introduction to the legal questions likely to be posed by
genetic prediction, consider first an issue that is (unfortunately)
already with us: Job applications by persons who test positive for
the AIDS virus. It is estimated that 1.5 million Americans now
carry the AIDS virus, HIV, but have not become ill.' In usual ways
of thinking, these individuals are afflicted with no disease.' How-
ever, the positive response to the blood test identifies them as be-
longing to a group with a very substantial chance of becoming
AIDS victims. Some. scientists say that all of them will develop
AIDS. 10 With today's capacity for treatment (no cure), the average
life expectancy of a person diagnosed as having AIDS (as opposed
to testing positive for the HIV virus) is 18 months. Between onset
of the disease and death, these victims will need medical care esti-
mated at $50,000 per person.1" Other costs to an em-
7 See Sandra N. Hurd, ed., Employment Testing: A National Reporter on Polygraph,
Drugs, AIDS and Genetic Testing BWR:73 (1987): "The Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Company is currently offering genetic testing to one thousand employee volunteers in the
Washington, D.C.-Northern Virginia area. The pilot testing program ... is an extension of
the company's long-standing concern for the health of its employees."
See also Alan L. Otten, Price of Progress, Wall St. J. 27 (Sept. 14, 1987), giving esti-
mated numbers of Americans afflicted by a disease that may have a genetic cause:
Alzheimer's disease, 2-4 million; adult polycystic kidney disease, 300,000 to 400,000; Hunt-
ington's disease, 25,000.
' Glenn Kramon, Business and Health: Kaiser Fears AIDS Influx, N.Y. Times sec. D, 2
(Nov. 17, 1987).
9 But see Thomas C. Schelling, Life, Liberty or the Pursuit of Happiness, forthcoming
in Isabel V. Sawhill, ed., Challenge to Leadership: Economic and Social Issues for the Next
Decade (1988). For further discussion, see note 69.
"0 In one California study, 70 percent of those carrying the virus acquired the disease
within eight years. See AIDS: Employer Rights and Responsibilities, Special Report (CCH)
par. 6 (1985).
" Remarks by Otis R. Bowen, M.D., reported in Rosemary DePaolis, AIDS in the
Workplace; Allstate Insurance Co. Conference, 88 Best's Review 110, 112 (Feb. 1988). Secre-
tary Bowen said the state and federal governments will spend $600 million in 1988 to treat
AIDS patients through Medicaid. He predicts the number will be $2.5 billion in 1992. About
60 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
ployer-absenteeism, morale among fellow employees, fear of con-
tagion-vary with the workplace context but can be heavy. What
should an employer do when an otherwise qualified job applicant is
AIDS-positive on a blood test?
The AIDS question is with us now, and it is a harbinger of
other, similar questions that will become increasingly relevant as
the "advance" (if so it be) of genetics-and of biology more gener-
ally-continues. Imagine that, before long, employers who now ask
for blood will extract a small quantity of DNA from the white cells.
At minor cost, they will learn certain percentage likelihoods about
the job applicant's medical future: Chance of heart attack, chance
of schizophrenia, chance of Alzheimer's disease.12 Suddenly, the
job applicant is not a member of an undifferentiated population
who are all subject to unpredictable health risks. Instead, this ap-
plicant has a statistically analyzable medical future that may well
be relevant in evaluating the consequences of adding him or her to
this firm's workforce. Does current antidiscrimination law con-
strain the use of that new information? Should we enact new laws
that would do so?"
II. ANTIDISCRIMINATION, ESPECIALLY DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF HANDICAP
Massive federal and state regulation now restricts employer
40% of AIDS patients are eligible for Medicaid. The Kaiser Permanente Health Plan esti-
mates a cost of $100,000 per AIDS patient. Kramon, Business and Health, N.Y. Times sec.
D, 2. For a wider range of cost estimates see Peter S. Arno and Phillip R. Lee, Economic
Costs of AIDS, in Victor Gong and Norman Rudnick, eds., AIDS: Facts and Issues 168
(1986).
," See, for example, Larry Tye, Blood Test May Warn of Alcoholism, Boston Globe 1
(Jan. 21, 1988): "A routine blood test may identify people at risk of becoming alcoholics
before they touch a drop." The story was based on Boris Tabakoff, Paula L. Hoffman, John
M. Lee, et al., Differences in. Platelet Enzyme Activity Between Alcoholics and
Nonalcoholics, 318 New Eng. J. Med. 134 (1988).
13 The leading works on this subject include Mark A. Rothstein, Employee Selection
Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1379 (1983); Thomas 0.
McGarity and Elinor P. Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 59 Tex. L. Rev.
999 (1981); Edith P. Canter, Employment Discrimination Implications of Genetic Screening
in the Workplace Under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, 10 Am. J. L. & Med. 323
(1984). The focus of these works and of much other literature is on screening of prospective
workers to identify those who present greater than average risks of occupational disease.
This article focuses on the employer's cost if a worker becomes ill, regardless of whether the
illness is related to the job. The issues of law and policy are not very different.
On the recent shift in the effort to achieve workplace health and safety from controlling
the environment to monitoring (but possibly later selecting and/or controlling) the worker
see Nicholas A. Ashford, Christine J. Spadafor and Charles C. Caldart, Human Monitoring:
Scientific, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 8 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 263 (1984).
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hiring decisions. Enactment and enforcement of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 created employment discrimination law,
and Title VII was the model for most subsequent antidiscrimina-
tion legislation. In that way, many of the ambiguities built into the
language and interpretation of Title VII were transposed into the
language and interpretation of later antidiscrimination statutes,
ambiguities that remain with us today.
One major regulatory initiative is the ban on discrimination
against handicapped workers, embodied in the federal Rehabilita-
tion Act of 197314 as well as in various state laws banning discrimi-
nation in employment on the basis of handicap.15 But this social
norm has so far not been much clarified by judicial decisions or
scholarly analysis, and we are in uncharted water when we seek to
apply our antidiscrimination laws to applicants whose medical fu-
tures can be predicted.
A. Title VII
Until 1964, employers had the legal authority to pick new em-
ployees according to whatever criteria they chose: Friendship, hair
color, race, sex, or charm. Employers were presumably limited by
the market. A competitive firm would be in trouble if it ignored a
better or cheaper supply of labor. Many employers, however, have
a degree of market power; and as long as there is no international
competition, market forces will not restrain refusals to hire that
are engaged in by all producers.16 Thus market-wide prohibitions
" 29 U.S.C. sec. 701-96.
" All 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted handicap-discrimination
statutes. However, Alabama, Mississippi and Wyoming ban such discrimination only as to
public employment, and Delaware does so by executive order rather than by statute. See
Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination, sec. 108 (1988); Mark A.
Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employment Relations and
Employment Law, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 683, 719-20 (1987); and Arthur S. Leonard, 14 Hof-
stra L. Rev. 11, 21 n. 52 (1985).
For the argument that handicapped persons should receive protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment, see Marcia P. Burgdorf and Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 15 Santa Clara L. Rev. 855, 899 (1975). The Supreme Court ad-
dressed constitutional claims on behalf of handicapped persons in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
" See Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (1971); Kenneth J. Arrow, The
Theory of Discrimination, in Orley Ashenfelter and Albert Rees, eds., Discrimination in La-
bor Markets 3 (1973); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1411
(1986); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev.
513 (1987); and John J. Donohue, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legis-
lation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 523 (1987).
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against a particular group can exist until social norms evolve or law
intervenes.
Although some states had enacted fair employment practice
laws before 1964, these laws applied only to race and religion. 7
The enforcement agencies had their hands full combatting the
most flagrant examples of Jim Crow, and never approached the
challenging and thorny issues spawned by Title VII.
Title VII did many things. It began the process of bringing
blacks into American society and the American economy, a process
in grievous remission from the end of Reconstruction. 8 It played a
part in the remarkable alteration of the distribution of American
work by gender. 9 It opened a window on-pulled back the cur-
tains from-the world of job selection, calling into moral question
habits and practices that had existed for decades.20 And it began a
society-wide inquiry into jobs themselves: What workers in fact do,
and what entry skills are in fact necessary.2'
" See, for example, Law Against Discrimination, 15 Consolidated Laws of N.Y. sec. 125
et seq. (enacted in 1945) in Thompson's Laws of New York (Supp. 1945).
"s For data on black gains (and non-gains) since enactment of Title VII, see Frank
Levy, Dollars and Dreams: The Changing American Income Distribution (1987); William
Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (1987); Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Pro-
gress After 1964: Who Has Gained and Why?, in Sherwin Rosen, ed., Studies in Labor Mar-
kets 247 (1981).
"o Title VII's protection of women was the result not of a popular movement and strong
political support but of a legislative maneuver that backfired. Although Title VII was con-
sidered in committee and reached the floor of the House of Representatives as a proposal to
ban discrimination by race, opponents, seeking to make the bill more radical and so more
difficult to support, added an amendment banning sex discrimination. Those opponents re-
ceived a well-deserved shock when Congress enacted the entire measure, including the pro-
vision they hoped would sink it. See E. W. Kenworthy, Jobs Issue Blocks Attempt in House
to Vote on Rights, N.Y. Times 1 (Feb. 9, 1964). Thus, with no prior legislative preparation
and very little prior political organization and demand, the United States granted to women
a legal right to equal job opportunities. This event then had large consequences in the next
quarter-century, when women's labor force participation expanded rapidly resulting in mas-
sive social change.
"0 One story that I have studied is the decade-long controversy over selecting police
officers in New York City. The old system was a civil service test, and applicants worked
hard to get a passing score. See Patrick Fenton, The Way Police Exams Used to Be, N.Y.
Times 23 (July 27, 1985). Most successful applicants were white males, and the test could
not be validated as relevant to police work. Many good faith attempts failed to produce a
substitute test that satisfied the judicial standards of relevance or a test that blacks passed
in appropriate numbers. Finally even Mayor Koch, a strong opponent of quotas, agreed to
let selection occur by taking the highest scoring whites and the highest scoring blacks in an
appropriate ratio. The question remains: If the test is not relevant to police work, is it fair
to deny white and black applicants whose score is one point below the cut-off for members
of their respective races? The litigated case was Guardians Ass'n of New York City v. Civil
Serv., 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980).
" See the account of the litigation restructuring policies at what was then the largest
private employer in the U.S. in Phyllis Wallace, ed., Equal Employment Opportunity and
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Title VII, and the attention it received as its interpretation
was debated and implementation occurred, legitimated the idea of
antidiscrimination.22 However, as Owen Fiss saw early in the life of
Title VII, a basic ambiguity is lodged in the concept of a ban on
job discrimination according to race, sex, or age.23 Is the goal sim-
ply to end formal discrimination? If so, applicants hereafter will be
considered without regard to their race, sex, and age; every other
basis for choice, however, will remain legitimate, even those (con-
nections, subjective supervisor choice, formal educational creden-
tials) likely to perpetuate differentials in the access to jobs of par-
ticular groups in the population. Or is the goal a more active and
far-reaching one: To spread opportunity to groups previously
barred by legally sanctioned (in some instances legally mandated)
discrimination? These are the alternative goals early addressed as
"equality of access" versus "equality of outcome. '24
There are ways individual employers can bridge the gap be-
tween these two alternatives. They can reassess their criteria, alter-
ing exclusionary standards that in fact are not necessary for the
job.23 They can search and recruit harder, and in new places. Both
approaches promote not only equality of access, but also equality
of outcome. But the problem remains, as is shown by continuing
controversy over so-called reverse discrimination, seniority rights,
the AT&T Case (1976).
22 Thus in 1968 when the elderly had achieved a political position enabling enactment
of legislation affecting their work opportunities, the language used was cribbed from Title
VII. See Goger v. H. K. Porter Company, Inc., 492 F.2d 13, 15-16 (3d Cir. 1974), overruled
on other grounds by Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir.
1978). Compare Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. sec. 621-34, with
42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2000e-17. Since issues of job discrimination due to age are quite differ-
ent from those of discrimination due to race or sex, the result was that the legislative pro-
cess did a poor job of resolving the basic policy issues concerning job rights of the elderly.
See Lawrence M. Friedman, Your Time Will Come: The Law of Age Discrimination and
Mandatory Retirement (1984); Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 Yale L.J. 27 (1979); and Peter H. Schuck, Age Discrimination
Revisited, 57 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1029 (1981).
On rising demands for antidiscrimination protection see Daniel Bell, The Cultural Con-
tradictions of Capitalism 196-98 (1976).
For a provocative argument, based on interviews with victims of discrimination, that
antidiscrimination ideology has served "to reinforce the victimization of women and racial
minorities," see Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Vic-
tims 2 (1988).
23 Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235 (1971).
24 A third position can be defended: That the law should bar criteria that perpetuate
the effects of prior discrimination.
22 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), analyzed in Lance Liebman, Jus-
tice White and Affirmative Action, 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 471 (1987).
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and quotas.2
B. The Rehabilitation Act
Federal law first addressed the issue of discrimination accord-
ing to handicap in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.27 As enacted in
1973, Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("the Act")
protected persons who could benefit from the rehabilitation pro-
grams authorized in the other parts of the statute. In 1974, the
definition of handicapped person was changed to make the law a
general charter of rights for handicapped workers (or at least for
those employed by firms that receive federal contracts or by pro-
grams that receive federal financial assistance).28
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to firms that do
at least $2,500 in business with the federal government. Those
companies must take affirmative action to employ and promote
handicapped individuals. The remedy is a proceeding brought by
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs in the De-
partment of Labor. Section 504, on the other hand, applies to all
programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance, with
no minimum dollar amount. "Otherwise qualified" individuals with
handicaps may not be excluded from participation in such pro-
grams.29 Violation can give rise to a private cause of action brought
by the person illegally denied the benefits of the federally-assisted
program. 0
26 The latest case is Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). I re-
cently canvassed this subject, Liebman, 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 471. For a different perspective
see the new foreword by Professor Nathan Glazer to his Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic
Inequality and Public Policy (1987), accepting the "stability" of the current muddled state
of the law.
27 29 U.S.C. sec. 701-96 (1982). For the origins and early administrative and judicial
history of Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see Richard K. Scotch, From
Good Will to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal Disability Policy (1984) ("Transforming
Federal Policy"). See also Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State (1984); and Michael A.
Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 Geo. L.J. 1435, 1464-65
n. 117 (1986).
There is virtually no relevant legislative history concerning Sections 503 and 504:
It appears that most members of Congress either were unaware that Section 504
was included in the act or saw the section as little more than a platitude, a state-
ment of a desired goal with little potential for causing institutional change.
Transforming Federal Policy at 54. The same could be said of section 503.
"2 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617, 1619; See
Jana H. Guy, The Developing Law on Equal Employment Opportunity for the Handi-
capped: An Overview and Analysis of the Major Issues, 7 U. Balt. L. Rev. 183, 230 (1977).
29 29 U.S.C. sec. 794.
20 This was the holding of Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624
(1984), aff'g LeStrange v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 687 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1982).
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1. Purposes of the Act. When Congress enacted Sections 503
and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, it was not clear about what
ideas of legal protection it was validating, or about the extent to
which it was importing principles of antidiscrimination law from
the very different contexts of discrimination by race, sex, and
age.3 The attempt to legislate on behalf of job opportunities for
handicapped persons may include at least the following goals:
a) Preventing "handicap bigotry. ' '32 The purest example of
such bigotry is the employer who refuses a job to an epileptic
whose disease is completely controllable with medication, or to a
person in a wheel chair who can perform all aspects of a job. This
idea is similar to the concept of equality of access in race and sex
discrimination law. One way in which it is similar is that it re-
quires outside inquiry-by a court, for example-into the true re-
quirements of the job (as distinguished from conventional selection
criteria that may exclude blacks or women or handicapped persons
and that a judge concludes are not part of the essence of the job). 3
Regarding the analogy to race discrimination laws, see Transforming Federal Policy
at 141 (cited in note 27):
Since one staff member did have experience with another anti-discrimination
law, Title IX, the language of Title IX (and thus of Title VI) was rather arbitrar-
ily adapted into the forty-three words comprising section 504. The use of this lan-
guage was felicitous, since it evoked powerful legal precedents and symbolic values
of equality on behalf of disabled people. Thus access for disabled persons became
linked to the legacy of the black civil rights movement, a legal and generally un-
compromising commitment to guaranteeing access to publicly supported programs
and activities.
Creating this association ... was the result of action taken by a small number
of well-meaning individuals who were not altogether aware of what they were do-
ing but who happened upon a formulation that symbolized values likely to pro-
duce change and minimize opposition.
On what I earlier called the "psittacistic," or parrot-like, borrowing of legislative lan-
guage, see Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 860
(1976).
Recent analyses of the relationship between the Rehabilitation Act's effort to ban dis-
crimination against handicapped persons and the antidiscrimination principle in the con-
texts of race, sex, and age include Rebell, 74 Geo. L.J. at 1480-89 (cited in note 27); and
Judith Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Oppor-
tunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
69 Cornell L. Rev. 401 (1984).
32 A better phrase may be "discriminatory animus." See Doe v. Region 13 Mental
Hlth.-Mental Retard. Com'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1409 (5th Cir. 1983). The question of what
constitutes a handicap for purposes of the Act is deferred until later in the paper. See text
at notes 51-81.
33 The analogy to race and sex discrimination cases can be seen clearly in Bentivegna v.
U.S. Dept. of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982), which rejected a government rule banning
employment of diabetics who could not show a satisfactory blood sugar level. The court
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Related to the goal of prohibiting "handicap bigotry" is that
of prohibiting employers from implementing the prejudice of fel-
low-workers or customers.3 ' The economic market might well not
discipline such prejudice because there may be few and isolated
victims and because it may reflect attitudes widely shared among
competitors. A statute implementing these goals 35 would prohibit
discrimination on the basis of a handicap if that mental or physical
condition bears no relation to job performance, as an outside re-
viewer evaluates the true purpose of the job.
A law so intended would raise one important question: Why
enact it only as to those irrelevant criteria that are categorized
handicaps? Employers sometimes reject applicants because of their
height, physical appearance,36 lack of charm, or low scores on tests
of uncertain relevance to the job (LSAT, bar exam). Why not enact
a law banning "discrimination" (job refusal) for reasons unrelated
to the task (as judicially defined)?3 7 For example, should a law
banning discrimination on the basis of handicap protect a person
borrowed the "business necessity" test created by judges in Title VII cases. It said that the
Rehabilitation Act's purposes require judicial review of employer claims that good health is
required for a particular job: "Potentially troublesome health problems will affect a large
proportion of the handicapped population." Id. at 623. Thus, employer rules must be con-
nected directly to "business necessity or safe performance of the job." Id.
" The Supreme Court recently held that section 504 forbids discrimination on the basis
of "the negative reactions" of others to an employee's handicap, even when that handicap is
a disease that can be contagious. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct.
1123, 1129 (1987). For this issue in sex and race discrimination contexts, see Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
"' Or even a constitutional provision, see Ill. Const. art. I, sec. 19: "All persons with a
physical or mental handicap ... shall be free from discrimination ... unrelated to ability in
the hiring and promotion practices of any employer."
36 Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimina-
tion on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 2035 (1987).
" An analogy can be drawn to the position taken by Justice Marshall in his dissenting
opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972), that anyone refused a govern-
ment job should get an explanation.
For an example of a court struggling to prevent a handicap discrimination law from
becoming a general law against arbitrary refusals to employ see Advocates for Handicapped
v. Sears, Roebuck, 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 516, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978):
[W]e feel that [the plaintiff's] approach would extend the proscriptions of the Act
well beyond the scope intended by the legislature. Since virtually every considera-
tion upon which an employer is likely to evaluate a prospective or current em-
ployee may be classified as either a mental or physical condition, the Act would be
transformed into a universal discrimination law. Even such conditions as sex, age
and race could be denominated as physical conditions and thus could be swept
within the purview of the [handicap laws]. As [the plaintiff] himself admits, these
characteristics are generally considered to fall within a different category than
mental or physical handicaps and the legislature has clearly dealt with them as
being distinct.
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who is obese?38 One aspect of obesity may be distaste among fellow
employees. If obesity is a "disability," then fellow employee big-
otry cannot lawfully motivate the employer's decision under even
the weakest reading of protection for the handicapped. On the
other hand, whether it is a "disability" requires drawing a very fine
line between the limitations that are clearly covered, such as re-
striction to a wheelchair, and characteristics that have traditionally
influenced job choices but seem far-removed from the common-
sense purpose of handicap protections statutes, such as physical
beauty. As TRB wrote in the New Republic, it is interesting that a
Harvard Law Review student note wants to ban discrimination
against the ugly but not discrimination according to minutely dif-
ferent scores on the Law School Aptitude Test:
Well, the one citadel of prejudice we may be sure is 'free
from storming by the battalions of Harvard Law School
is our society's overwhelming bias in favor of smart peo-
ple. They may be short, fat, and ugly up there, with pro-
truding ears, unusual noses, jutting chins, and dyspeptic
personalities. But they're not dumb. 9
There are several possible reasons for deciding to add to the
list of forbidden selection standards (a list already including race,
sex, and age) only those arbitrary criteria that fall in the clumsily
defined category we label "disabilities" or "handicaps." First, inef-
ficient discrimination against the handicapped may be thought to
be a phenomenon that is widely shared and pernicious, whereas
use of other arbitrary criteria may be more diverse and random
38 State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox, 65 N.Y.2d 213, 480 N.E.2d 695 (1985), dis-
cussed in text at notes 98-100.
39 TRB from Washington, The Tyranny of Beauty, New Republic 4 (Oct. 12, 1987),
criticizing Note, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 2035 (cited in note 36). See also Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, Knowledge and Politics 169 and 172-73 (1975):
[Tihe exercise of power by some men over others on the basis of the natural allo-
cation of talents must therefore come to be felt as a surrender by society to the
arbitrariness of nature and as a submission by the dominated to the personal su-
periority of the dominant. The brute facts of natural advantage are made decisive
to the distribution of power ....
The closer the assignment of jobs comes to the ideal of merit, the more deci-
sive the influence of natural talents in determining social place. The hierarchy of
talents, distributed by nature without regard to men's moral purposes, succeeds
the accident of inherited wealth and opportunity. The lucky ones can then cash in
on the favors of nature like prostitutes whose price depends on whether they are
fat or slim. The exercise of power by the higher talents over the less gifted be-
comes simply another form of personal domination unless a moral standard can be
found to justify and limit it.
68 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
and so may not have such a large and continuing impact on partic-
ular individuals or groups. Second, we may have a special solici-
tude as to conditions or lacks to which we can apply the label
"medical. '4 0 Third, if unable to get work, the "handicapped" are a
group whom society must or will support, so taxpayers will save
money if they can be assured labor-market income.41 Fourth, the
physically or mentally handicapped person has declined (perhaps
before birth) from some hypothetical form of good health. Thus
perhaps this person "deserves" social treatment more like what he
or she would have had if healthy. The person at his or her maxi-
mum capacity may "deserve" nothing more than that. Fifth, the
"handicapped" (or the "disabled"4 2) may be a group of people who
have managed to make themselves an effective force in the politi-
cal process.' Those affected by non-medical decisions have not (so
far) achieved a comparable voice. Finally, it may be an onerous
task for government to attempt to intervene as to all inefficient or
arbitrary job criteria, and intervention to protect the handicapped
may be, for all the reasons above, the first priority."
40 See Erving Goffman, Stigma (1963); Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor (1978); Stone,
The Disabled State (cited in note 27); and Liebman, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (cited in note 31).
" Society may be more hard-hearted towards those who are without work but not la-
beled disabled. See Liebman, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 833. If so, it may be rational to focus job
opportunities on those who would otherwise receive more generous social benefits.
"' On the issue of what label to use see David A. Larson, What Disabilities are Pro-
tected Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 37 Lab. L.J. 752, 752 n. 4 (1986). See also
Transforming Federal Policy at 179 n. 1 (cited in note 27): "Many people with disabling
conditions prefer to be called disabled rather than handicapped, claiming that 'handicaps'
are unnecessary social restrictions placed on them as a result of their disabilities. The term
disabled will be used here .... " In 1986 Congress changed the language in the Rehabilita-
tion Act from "handicapped individuals" to "individuals with handicaps." Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1986 Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807, 1810, codified at 29 U.S.C. sec.
706 (1982).
' On that political development, see Stone, The Disabled State (cited in note 27).
See Transforming Federal Policy at 69 et seq. (cited in note 27) for a discussion of
the mid-1970's dispute within HEW over whether the Rehabilitation Act regulations should
include "poor people, aged people, homosexuals, and drug and alcohol addicts within the
definition of handicapped individuals." See also Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Governing America
261 (1981): "It was the only part of the regulations in which President Carter expressed any
interest. At the cabinet meeting on March 21, 1977, Carter said he did not want drug ad-
dicts or alcoholics classified as handicapped." Statutory amendments in 1978 addressed this
issue but did not exactly solve it. The Act's coverage does not include "any individual who is
an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual
from performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment... would constitute
a direct threat to property or safety of others." 29 U.S.C. sec. 706(8)(B). This provision was
intended to make it more difficult for persons with alcohol and drug problems to obtain
protection under the Act. See the discussion in Rothstein, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 713-18
(cited in note 15). Does the 1978 amendment mean that the Act forbids employers from
discrimination against cigarette smokers? See Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ
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b) Ensuring equality of outcome. Legislation forbidding dis-
crimination against the handicapped could attempt to give job op-
portunities to handicapped persons even if the refusals that would
occur in the absence of the law are economically rational and job-
related. That is, society might say: "We wish to make it possible
for these individuals to work. Therefore we will pay a social cost to
allow that to happen. The cost will be the output loss for the em-
ployer. It will also be-in a sense-the denial of the job to the non-
handicapped individual who would have it otherwise."
This norm could be implemented in any of three ways. First, a
policy intervention attacking discrimination on the basis of handi-
cap could give an absolute preference (or an absolute forgiveness)
by attempting to ensure employment irrespective of handicap.
This interpretation is supported by statutory language."' Arguing
against it are its apparently unacceptable consequences (blind bus
drivers), and the unlikelihood that the public supports so much
alteration of workplace arrangements to provide job opportunities
for handicapped persons.4" Thus, it is more likely that a legal ban
on some economically rational discrimination against the handi-
capped would follow a different path. One possibility is a ban
against certain group-based predictions rationally based on experi-
ence.47 It is now unlawful to refuse jobs to women because some
women will become pregnant and leave the labor market." It is
Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 940, 956-57
(1987).
'5 See 29 U.S.C. sec. 794: "No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall,
solely by reason of his handicap ... be subjected to discrimination."
46 Many persons are without work in the nation's economy, and no public commitment
has been made to provide them with job opportunities. The most recent public considera-
tion of this issue resulted only in the Full Employment and Balanced Growth (Humphrey-
Hawkins) Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. sec. 3101, which merely pronounces hortatory goals and
calls for regular reports by the President. In 1978 President Carter's Better Job and Income
Act (BJIA) would have tied AFDC benefits to a work requirement only if the government
offered a job. The BJIA was not enacted.
17 See generally Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 Yale L.J. 1408, 1436 (1979):
The idea that each individual should have the opportunity to seek his own destiny
occupies a high place in the hierarchy of American values. Although any decision
to rely on predictive judgments poses some threat to the autonomy of individuals,
that threat is greatest when the predictions are based on factors over which an
individual applicant has no control.
48 See Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1108 (1983) (O'Connor,
concurring):
Congress in enacting Title VII intended to prohibit an employer from singling out
an employee by race or sex for the purpose of imposing a greater burden or deny-
ing an equal benefit because of a characteristic statistically identifiable with the
group but empirically false in many individual cases.
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unlawful to refuse to hire a black applicant because blacks as a
group have performed badly in the past and are predicted to do so
in the future. If some persons in wheelchairs or with drug-con-
trolled epilepsy will be inefficient workers because of their condi-
tion but some with the condition will be successful workers, we
could refuse to permit that percentage possibility to be taken into
account in hiring decisions."' But most (indeed, virtually all) hiring
decisions are based on predictions. Why ban this particular
prediction?
A third means of implementing this norm would be to say that
hiring the handicapped is an appropriate expenditure of public re-
sources. We would need to explain why employers should be legally
bound to spend in this way, and we would need to determine the
extent to which costly accommodation must be made."
2. What is a Handicap? The Rehabilitation Act does a poor
job of choosing among these possible explanations for statutory re-
striction of employer hiring decisions. The Act merely poses ques-
tions: What is a handicap? To what extent must employers hire
handicapped persons even if the employment of those persons will
impose economic costs?
As Rehabilitation Act cases now arise, applicants and employ-
ers both face difficult litigation challenges." The employer must
show that the applicant's condition is not a handicap, despite evi-
dence that the condition was the basis for the employer's refusal to
give the job to this applicant. On the other hand, the prospective
employee must demonstrate that although she is very handi-
capped, she nonetheless is qualified.
Most judges and litigants who have addressed the issue of fu-
ture impairments have not seen the doctrinal questions clearly. It
is hard to define a handicap. Congress and the legislatures meant
to include conditions that are in some form seen by the public as
medical."2 They also meant to emphasize conditions that arise
" This version of the antidiscrimination principle would, however, permit an employer
to use an applicant's own employment record and experiences to predict that her handicap
would diminish her job performance.
'0 See Amer. Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. v. Dole, 676 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa.
1988), striking down a Department of Transportation regulation limiting to three percent of
its budget the amount of money a mass transit operator must spend to provide access for
the disabled. This regulation was issued in May 1986.
" Each side confronts a Catch 22; is the situation thus a Catch 44? On the Catch 22
aspect, see Doe v. Region 13 Mental Hlth.-Mental Retard. Com'n., 704 F.2d 1402, 1408 n. 6
(5th Cir. 1983).
5 See 42 U.S.C. sec. 423(d)(1)(A) (1982): Eligibility for Social Security Disability bene-
fits and for Supplemental Security Income Disability benefits requires a "medically determi-
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through no voluntary choice by the victim." And they meant con-
ditions that reflect a "fall" or "decline" by the individual from that
person's "normal" level. All that is problematic in the border-line
cases, but it is problematic in ways familiar from the endlessly liti-
gated context of qualification for Social Security Disability and
Supplemental Security Income Disability benefits."" Thus, the de-
pressive neurotic is handicapped.5 So, closer to the line, is the per-
son who is unusually sensitive to tobacco smoke." So is the person
who had one leg amputated;5 7 the person with tennis elbow;" and
the bus driver with carbon monoxide phobia." But the statute
does not protect the plaintiff who misses a great deal of work be-
cause he is "unable to cope with the stress of his job,"6 0 or the
person who asks statutory protection for his left-handedness."
A statement issued by the Department of Justice in 198662
casts some light on the question of whether the risk of future dis-
ease is a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act. The statement
argues that an employer does not violate the Act if it refuses a job
I
nable" condition. Compare Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988) (alcoholism assumed
to result from willful misconduct unless the result of an acquired psychiatric disorder).
13 See Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984), finding no pro-
tection under the Act for a man refused a job as an airline attendant because he exceeded
the maximum weight for a person of his height. Plaintiff was not obese: He engaged in
extensive body building and had a low percentage of body fat. The court said: "[W]hat
plaintiff is really suing for is his right to be both a body builder and a flight attendant, a
right that Section 504 was not intended to protect." Id. at 746.
" See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Social Security Disability and Mass Justice (1973); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Charles J. Goetz, Frank I. Goodman, et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals
(1978); Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (1983); and Liebman, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 833
(cited in note 31).
" See Doe, 704 F.2d 1402 (cited in note 51) (court held plaintiff was handicapped but
not otherwise qualified because her suicidal tendencies might inhibit her work with
patients).
" See Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 87 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (sensitivity
is a handicap but VA made sufficient efforts to accommodate plaintiff's needs). Compare
GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 227, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979) (legislature of
North Carolina did not intend to classify those harmed by tobacco smoke as handicapped).
57Melvin v. City of West Frankfort, 93 Ill. App. 3d 425, 417 N.E.2d 260 (1981) (statute
banning hiring of amputee for police and fire jobs violates Illinois constitutional provision
forbidding discrimination against the handicapped).
68 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 154 Ill. App.3d 424, 506 N.E.2d 1029
(1987).
" Barnes v. Barbosa, 144 Ill. App. 3d 860, 494 N.E.2d 619 (1986).
60 Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
, See de la Torres v. Bulger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986).
6 Memorandum for Ronald E. Robertson, Gen. Couns., Dep't of Health and Hum. Ser-
vices, Re: Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS, AIDS-
Related Complex, or Infection with the AIDS Virus, signed by Charles J. Cooper, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., U.S. Dep't of Just. (June 20, 1986).
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because an applicant tests positive for the AIDS virus.63 The De-
partment gave two reasons. First, it said that the employer would
be justified in refusing employment because prospective fellow em-
ployees had an incorrect fear of contagion. The Supreme Court re-
jected this position in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,"
holding that the Act proscribes denial of employment benefits "be-
cause of the prejudicial attitudes or the ignorance of others. '"
This is the bigotry interpretation of the Act. The Supreme Court
took its stand for medicine and science, and against community
suspicion and fear." The Court could do nothing else in light of
the successful history of enforcing antidiscrimination laws in oppo-
sition to stereotypes in the context of race, religion, sex, and age
discrimination.6
" The Reagan Administration has not spoken with one voice on this matter. See, for
example, Remarks by Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, All-
state Division Forum on Aids, Washington, D.C., Jan. 20, 1988, reported in Jerry Estill,
Bowen Warns of Discrimination Against Employees with AIDS, Boston Globe 10 (Jan. 21,
1988): "Health and Human Services Secretary Otis R. Bowen said: . .. 'Firing or otherwise
discriminating against somebody with AIDS transgresses a great many legal as well as hu-
manitarian considerations.' " Perhaps Secretary Bowen was not referring to discrimination
in hiring or to discrimination against a person testing positive for the AIDS virus. But the
newspaper reports of his speech suggested that he thought a broad antidiscrimination rule
would be good social policy. Earlier, however, Secretary Bowen had spoken somewhat differ-
ently. See Joe Davidson, AIDS Bill Barring Discrimination Opposed by Bowen, Wall St. J.
72 (Sept. 22, 1987).
" 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
" Id. at 1129.
66 The question is more complicated. Who will decide what is the relevant scientific
truth, and will the risks of imperfect knowledge be put on employers, fellow workers, and
consumers or on individuals who test positive? See Robert Pear, Key Jobs in Military Off
Limits for AIDS-Infected, N.Y. Times 1 (Dec. 19, 1987): "Officials of the Defense Depart-
ment said today that military personnel infected with the AIDS virus were being removed
from sensitive, stressful jobs because of new evidence that the virus could impair mental
function, even in people who show no overt symptoms of the disease." Undoubtedly judges
will tread lightly when second-guessing the military, even though elementary school-teach-
ing is also "sensitive" and "stressful," and even though the Rehabilitation Act makes no
distinction. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (finding no Fifth Amendment viola-
tion in exemption of women from duty to register for the military draft).
67 Conservatives tried to overturn Arline in Congress. See H.R. 1396, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. in 133 Cong. Rec. H992 (March 4, 1987), introduced by Rep. Dannemeyer, which
would "amend the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to exclude individuals with contagious dis-
eases from the definition of handicapped individuals;" and S. 673, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. in
133 Cong. Rec. S2820 (March 6, 1987), introduced by Sen. Dole (similar). These two bills
were introduced several days after the Arline decision. Instead, Congress appears to have
legislated in support of protection for ill persons who are not contagious. The Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), was enacted (over Presi-
dent Reagan's veto) in 1988 to overturn Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). The
Act added to the definition of "individuals with handicaps" in Sections 503 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act this language:
[Sluch term does not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease
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Second, the Justice Department memorandum said that the
person who tests positive for the AIDS virus as yet has no disease,
is not handicapped, and therefore is not protected by the Act."
This argument turns upon a very limited understanding of the
purposes of the Act. The statute offers protection to those medi-
cally afflicted. A person testing positive for the AIDS virus is so
afflicted. The person who is AIDS-positive has a physical malfor-
mation that has a predictable percentage possibility of leading to
illness (contraction of AIDS), inability to work, and death. Indeed,
some observers have suggested that the physical malformation is
itself the disease, of which AIDS is the final, fatal stage. 9 If an
epileptic whose disease is controllable with drugs cannot be refused
a job on the basis of predicted illness, 0 why should an employer be
or infection, and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who ... is unable to
perform the duties of the job.
29 U.S.C. sec. 706(8)(C).
One commentator sees this provision as likely to "eliminate the obligation of federally
funded employers to reasonably accommodate [AIDS-]infected employees." Nicholas Hent-
off, A Legal Virus on Top of the AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times 31 (Apr. 16, 1988). It is more
likely, however, to reaffirm Arline's protection for persons testing positive for or already
afflicted with AIDS who can still work in jobs where the current medical conclusion is that
casual contact poses no threat to fellow employees or the public.
See Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of California, 840 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir.
1988) (applying Arline). Compare Doe by Doe v. Belleville Public School Dist. No. 118, 672
F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Ill. 1987) (Education for All Handicapped Children Act does not apply to
AIDS victim).
"' The memo said the person with AIDS or AIDS Related Complex is protected by the
Act. Memorandum for Robertson at 22-29 (cited in note 62). See Shuttleworth v. Broward
County, 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (individual with AIDS is handicapped for purpose
of Rehabilitation Act). But the memo then took it back, saying that since someone who is
contagious but not sick can be refused a job (that person is not yet handicapped), therefore
the person who is contagious and sick (has AIDS) can be refused on the grounds of conta-
gion and is not the victim of discrimination on the basis of handicap. The ability to reason
in this way may be a genetic trait that has lain dormant since the 13th century.
11 Professor Schelling has it right:
When first diagnosed, the disease was called the acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome, AIDS, and its symptoms were malignancies, infections, and brain damage.
Since discovery of the virus-and there may be several forms of the virus-it has
made more and more sense to think of the disease as infection with the virus, a
condition that is asymptomatic for at least months and usually some years, and to
think of AIDS as a fatal end stage of that disease.
Schelling, Life, Liberty or the Pursuit of Happiness at 8-9 (cited in note 9). This also seems
to be the position of the U.S. Surgeon General: "When a person is sick with AIDS, he/she is
in the final stages of a series of health problems caused by a virus (germ) that can be passed
from one person to another." U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Surgeon General's
Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 10 (1987).
'0 See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985), which found a violation of
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act-covering federal employment-when the Postal Ser-
vice refused a job to an applicant who had averaged one daytime grand mal seizure per year.
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able to deny work because a person not yet afflicted is believed
likely to contract a disease? The AIDS-positive is refused because
the employer is worried (perhaps rationally) about the efficiency
consequences that will result when and if the prediction turns into
reality. If the Act forbids adverse consequences from having the
disease, should it not ban consequences from being likely to have it
in the future? Indeed, the statute says that a "handicapped indi-
vidual" is a person who "has a physical or mental impairment" or
"is regarded as having such an impairment."'71 Although the words
are in the present tense, and the employer can thus argue that
they do not yet cover the AIDS-positive, they turn the focus to the
workplace consequences for individuals, which inevitably are de-
termined by both the physical condition of the applicant's body
and the interpretation given to that condition by employers.
Although the Department of Justice's position is wrong and is
not likely to prevail, it highlights the difficulty of defining the list
of criteria, otherwise relevant to the profit-seeking employer, that
the Rehabilitation Act places out of bounds. More generally, it
highlights the difficulty of making a policy decision about which
such criteria should be prohibited by antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. Even if the Act can be read as covering the risk of future
illness, why should it be so read?
There is a strong argument for permitting employers to con-
sider the possibility of future illness-for example, for permitting
them to extract DNA, analyze it, and weigh medical costs among
all other selection criteria. The argument is as follows: People pre-
sent themselves for work. They offer a great range of desirable and
The court's test was whether the employer had shown a "reasonable probability of substan-
tial harm" and whether it could accommodate the worker without "undue hardship." See
also Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. Labor & Industry, 98 Wis.2d 592, 297 N.W.2d 819 (1980).
" 29 U.S.C. sec. 706(8)(B) (emphasis added). This language was added to the act as a
'technical and clarifying' amendment" in 1974. See Transforming Federal Policy at 66
(cited in note 27). See also Ill. Fair Employment Practices Comm. Guidelines on Discrimina-
tion in Employment Under the Fair Employment Practices Act, art. 3, sec. 3.2 (1976): "any
physical or mental impairment ... which constitutes or is regarded as constituting a sub-
stantial limitation," cited in Caterpillar, 506 N.E.2d at 1031 (cited in note 58), and Micro
Switch v. Human Rights Commissioner, 164 Ill. App.3d 589, 517 N.E.2d 587 (1987). Com-
pare the language of the Rehabilitation Act with that of the handicap discrimination law of
New South Wales, Australia, which applies to: "[A] person who, as the result of having a
physical impairment to his body, and having regard to any community attributes relating to
persons having the same physical impairment ... is limited in opportunities." Anti-Discrim-
ination Act, sec. 4(1), (5) & (6), part IVA (New South Wales 1977) in Australia Limited
(CCH) par. 7-460. The New South Wales definition of "physical impairment" is also inter-
esting: "[A] defect or disturbance of the normal structure and functioning of a person's
body, whether arising from a condition subsisting at birth or from illness or injury." Id.
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undesirable characteristics. One does well on standardized tests,
another had all A's in high school, a third is charming in an inter-
view, a fourth is physically attractive, a fifth has contacts likely to
produce business. Applicant six says this: "My wife works for the
university hospital, which has an excellent medical plan that in-
cludes spouses. If you hire me, I won't enroll in your medical plan
and you will save $2,500 per year." Should the employer be forbid-
den from giving weight to that consideration? Now consider the
employee who proudly offers his or her "negative" on the AIDS
test,72 or his or her DNA-report showing a greater-than-average
likelihood of good health throughout an extended work life. Why
would a society ban consideration of this information where it is
rationally related to output? Putting the same point in a different
way, why should those who offer good health be denied the advan-
tages available to those who are smart or charming or tall or physi-
cally dexterous?"
Very few cases have addressed the issue of whether an em-
ployer can deny employment on the basis of the possibility of fu-
ture sickness. Cases protecting job applicants against decisions not
to hire them because of predictions of future illness or injury in-
clude Dairy Equipment Co. v. Department of Indus., Etc.,7 where
plaintiff was fired because, having only one kidney, his work as a
truck assembler 10-12 feet above a concrete floor exposed him "to
an undue risk of injury to his remaining kidney" and exposed the
company to the risk of paying $20,000 to $30,000 for a kidney
transplant or $8,000 for a dialysis machine;75 Kimmel v. Crowley
7 This issue is not merely hypothetical, In the largest survey so far of business leaders'
views on AIDS (623 diverse companies responded), only one in four said their companies
would hire an applicant if they knew he or she had "been exposed" to AIDS. About four in
ten said the applicant would be rejected. Business Response to AIDS, National Survey
sponsored by Fortune Magazine and Allstate Insurance (1988).
73 The Justice Department's "legal opinion" on AIDS and the Rehabilitation Act posed
the following hypothetical case: an individual who is immune from a disease (such as AIDS)
but can spread the disease to others. The Justice Department document argued that such a
person has no handicap (he or she can do any job) and thus has no legal protection against
an employer's decision not to hire due to fear of contagion. Memorandum for Robertson at
24-25 (cited in note 62). It is easy to argue that Justice is wrong: That the hypothetical
applicant suffers from a "medical"-type condition that is the reason he or she is not hired.
But if the Rehabilitation Act covers this individual, why is there no legal protection for
others who may attract social scorn or enmity: The person who is unattractive, or speaks
oddly, or is socially or physically clumsy, or is regarded as unfriendly. It is understandable
that Congress decided to intervene in a decentralized employment system only on behalf of
"medical" victims, but hard to be as confident as the Justice Department that the line be-
tween "medical" and "non-medical" can be clearly drawn.
95 Wis.2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980).
' 290 N.W.2d at 332. The company violated the Fair Employment Act because it "per-
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Maritime Corp., protecting a plaintiff whose history of knee inju-
ries suggested future problems;76 Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v.
State Dept. of I., L. & H. R., protecting a plaintiff with asthma;77
and, perhaps most extraordinarily, Neeld v. American Hockey
League, refusing to let the American Hockey League discriminate
against a potential player with only one eye. 8
Courts have permitted employers to discriminate on the basis
of a risk of future impairment when, for some reason the judges
cannot quite specify, the applicant's or worker's condition ought
not to be considered a handicap. For example, Burgess v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co. gave no relief to a plaintiff suffering from
glaucoma because with glasses his vision was 20/20.7' Advocates for
the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.80 refused protection
under the Illinois Constitution and statute to a plaintiff denied a
job as an uninsurable risk because he had had a kidney transplant.
The court said it looks to "the ordinary and popularly understood
meaning" of the word handicapped, and found that this condition
was not within that definition.8'
3. Otherwise Qualified. The second half of the handicap dis-
crimination puzzle is deciding the extent of the accommodation
that should be provided to those determined to be covered by the
statute. Again, the Rehabilitation Act is not a model of good draft-
ing. 2 Congress used words suggesting an absolute preference: "No
otherwise qualified individual .. . shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded."8 Congress probably meant "qualified,"
ceived and/or regarded the respondent's condition as a handicap and terminated his em-
ployment solely for that reason." The court rejected the argument that greater medical con-
sequences to respondent from a fall are an appropriate employment consideration.
11 23 Wash. App. 78, 596 P.2d 1069 (1979).
77 62 Wis.2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1974). Asthma is a disease "which makes
achievement unusually difficult." The court based its decision on Wis. Stat. Annot.
sec. 111.32(5) (West Supp. 1987).
7' 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). The court found a probable violation of the New
York Human Rights Law.
7- 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979). The statute should not be read as extending
coverage "to those who suffer from potentially disabling conditions." Id. at 253.
"0 67 Ill. App.3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978).
"' 385 N.E.2d at 42-43. "Since virtually every consideration upon which an employer is
likely to evaluate a prospective or current employee may be classified as either a mental or
physical condition, the Act would be transformed into a universal discrimination law." Id. at
43.
8 Authors of state handicap protection laws did not do much better. See, for example,
Kan. Stat. Annot. sec. 44-1009 (1986), declaring it unlawful "because of the ... physical
handicap ... of any person to refuse to hire ... without a valid business motive."
" 29 U.S.C. sec. 794 (1982). California's Civil Rights Act presents the same problem
with its language: "No business establishment ... shall discriminate against ... any person
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even if it said "otherwise qualified."
The Supreme Court faced this question in Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 4 a case that arose under Section 504. The
issue in Davis was admission into an educational institution (cov-
ered by the Rehabilitation Act because it received federal funds).
But the Supreme Court's opinion treated Ms. Davis's claim as if
she were seeking a job-quite appropriately, since without a nurs-
ing degree she could not become a nurse; and since the nursing
school based its refusal of admission in part on its prediction that
her handicap (deafness) would restrict her opportunities to use a
nursing degree in the job market. Davis said that Southeastern
Community College was under no obligation to ignore Ms. Davis's
handicap in evaluating her candidacy. The question was whether,
considering her handicap, she was qualified. 5 This interpretation
supports the inference that the goal of the Rehabilitation Act is
that of preventing handicap bigotry-exclusion of discrimination
on the basis of handicap where the handicap is irrelevant to ability
to do the job. The Court salvaged some force for the statute by
offering dicta suggesting that for some applicants with lesser
handicaps, reasonable accommodation to their needs might be le-
gally required. However, it did not require the college to supply
what Ms. Davis needed, an individual translator.
Even though the Supreme Court suggested in Davis that the
Rehabilitation Act means "qualified" when it says "otherwise qual-
ified," the litigated cases show judges struggling to decide the de-
gree of accommodation-of expense-that is appropriate. In every
one of the cases discussed above, there is reason to think that the
employee's condition imposes some cost or risk on the employer. 6
in this state because of the race, creed, religion, color, natural origin, sex, or blindness or
other physical disability of the person." Annot. Cal. Civ. Code sec. 51.5 (West Supp. 1988).
84 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
85 Id. at 407. But see Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372
(10th Cir. 1981), holding that plaintiff was illegally denied admittance to a psychiatric resi-
dency program because he suffered from multiple sclerosis. The court rejected, as a ration-
ale for not admitting the plaintiff, the selecting doctors' "general knowledge of multiple
sclerosis and their concern for psychologic reactions of the patient and in turn the doctor, as
a result of his being in a wheelchair." Id. at 1386. One doctor said that Dr. Pushkin "is
teachable, but to face the devastation, guilt, pity and rage that can be stirred up in his
patients by his physical condition appears to be too much to ask of his patients or of him."
Id. at 1387. There is a line that can be drawn between Davis and Pushkin, but it is exceed-
ingly thin.
86 Compare the dispute over whether an individual exposed to asbestos but not now
sick can recover today for the percentage likelihood of future cancer. Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986). Here the employer is making a similar
argument to the detriment of the job applicant who presents medical risks. If the employer
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The reader of scores of handicap-discrimination cases rarely sus-
pects the employer of acting out of stupidity (the bigotry category,
supra). Rather, the court finds the applicant-to be "otherwise qual-
ified" if the cost the employer must bear to accommodate the
workplace to the applicant's need or problem is determined to be
reasonable.
There are substantial social costs to requiring employers to ac-
commodate the special limitations of handicapped employees. Ac-
commodation reduces output. It may inconvenience other employ-
ees or cause them to feel unfairly treated in comparison with the
protected handicapped employee. The transaction costs of this
protection-litigation costs, threats of litigation, and assertions of
dubious claims-may be very high. Yet the social benefit may also
be very substantial. Accommodation of the workplace allows us to
supply assistance to the handicapped in the best possible way, with
job opportunities rather than welfare payments.88 It also assures all
citizens that if they become victims, society will-adapt the employ-
ment system to their needs. All of this gives us a theoretically ac-
ceptable explanation of the handicap laws, if only we could (and
were willing to) quantify what we mean by reasonable accommoda-
tion." A student note in the Harvard Law Review proposed:
pays medical expenses, it is hard to see a difference between the employer who fears future
lung cancer from a smoker and the employer afraid that this employee's special circum-
stances (e.g., women of child-bearing age; applicant with one kidney) create an unusually
great likelihood of work-related illness or injury. See, for example, two cases involving "fetal
vulnerability": Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
87 There are interesting analogies to the Unemployment Insurance issue of "involuntary
quit:" When is it reasonable for an employee to leave the job, so that she should not be
denied Unemployment Insurance benefits? See, for example, Raytheon Co. v. Director of
Division of Emp. Sec., 364 Mass. 593, 307 N.E.2d 330 (1974). Another analogy is to an
employer's obligation to make reasonable accommodation "to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(j)
(1982).
88 See Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and
Special Education, 48 L. & Contemp. Probs. 157 (1985).
88 The Supreme Court posed the Rehabilitation Act problem in a similar way in Alex-
ander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), rev'g Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir.
1983), when it said that the Act does not bar government decisions that have a disparate
impact on the handicapped but added:
Any interpretation of [the Rehabilitation Act] must therefore be responsive to two
powerful but countervailing considerations-the need to give effect to the statu-
tory objectives and the desire to keep [the Rehabilitation Act] within manageable
bounds .... While we reject the boundless notion that all disparate-impact show-
ings constitute prima facie cases . . . we assume without deciding that [the Act]
reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the
handicapped.
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(a) No handicapped person ... shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be denied employment . .. (1) if such a
person can perform the functions of the job in question
with the aid of any necessary accommodations, so long as
the cost of those accommodations does not exceed the
maximum statutory level, or (2) if the loss in productivity
that would result from such person's handicap . . . does
not exceed the maximum statutory level...
(b) The maximum statutory level for accommodation
costs shall be equal to X percent of the employee's an-
nual salary.90
The law review proposal is too clumsy. The public attitude
would distinguish among handicaps and order large accommoda-
tions to some and small ones to others. The idea is at odds with
the absolute antidiscrimination stance of some advocates for the
handicapped and not easy to square with statutory language de-
rived from the analogy to race and sex discrimination and there-
fore not written in language of reasonable accommodation or com-
parison of relative costs. Nevertheless, the proposal acknowledges
the current problem, and moves in the right direction."
C. Antidiscrimination Law and the Prediction of Future Disease
Davis and the hundreds of other handicap-discrimination
Id. at 299.
The Court's clearest statement was in a footnote:
[T]he ultimate question is the extent to which a grantee is required to make rea-
sonable modifications in its programs for the needs of the handicapped.
Id. at 299 n. 19.
'0 Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1013 (1984). See
also Rebell, 74 Geo. L.J. at 1458-59 (cited in note 27). The case that comes closest to this
cost-benefit calculation is Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd in
unpub. op. in 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), holding that Pennsylvania must pay the cost of
permitting three blind persons to work as clerks in the Department of Welfare. The money
was needed for salaries for sighted readers, the cost of translating manuals into braille, and
purchase of computerized braille machines. The court compared the cost not to the salaries
of the three employees (it was between l/3 and 1/2 of their salaries), but to the $300 million
welfare budget, finding the accommodation "not excessive."
For another example, the extra health insurance cost for a cigarette smoker has been
estimated at $75 to $150 per year. Mark A. Rothstein, Medical Screening and Employment
Law: A Note of Caution and Some Observations, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 1.
" Note the parallels to workplace health and safety, where comparison of benefits and
costs is inevitable but social institutions work hard to deny that such tradeoffs are made.
See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc., v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (The Cotton Dust
Case).
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cases that have now received appellate consideration (many of
them arising under state laws, because Davis is regarded by advo-
cates as giving a less favorable interpretation to the antidis-
crimination principle in the handicap discrimination context than
has been supplied by some state courts)92 identify the issues as
they are relevant to claims by applicants who do not want to be
judged according to predictions of their future health:
a) The bigotry claim: I am being excluded for something irrel-
evant to the job as the job ought to be defined. The state laws
banning use of lie detector tests and the federal Polygraph Protec-
tion Act of 1988"8 are in part justified by the view that because lie
detector tests are inaccurate, their conclusions should never be
used. Of course many criteria that have a high inaccuracy quotient
are not banned by any statute.
b) The individualism claim: Judge me as me, not as a member
of a group about which you make predictions."' But all selection is
based on likelihoods, possibilities, and predictions.
c) The reasonable accommodation claim: Give me a chance.
But which rational and efficient negative predictions should be dis-
counted? Indeed, which candidates should lose the benefits of their
positively-predicting characteristics and be passed over on behalf
of someone who is predicted to be a less productive worker?
d) The indignity claim: Using this criterion involves socially
undesirable intervention in my life. To the extent that the objec-
tion to lie detectors is not their inaccuracy but the indignity of an
individual's being strapped in with electrodes, the laws against the
machines belong in this category.
Future illnesses should not be considered differently from
other predictions about the prospective worker: His or her talent,
commitment, durability, or potential for growth. Where use of pre-
dictions has a differential impact on minorities or women, 5 they
"' There may also be relevance in the fact reported by Professors C. K. Rowland and
Robert Carp, that federal district judges appointed by President Carter "found bias against
the handicapped 61% of the time, Reagan appointees 25%." Stephen Wermeil, Tilting
Bench, Wall St. J. 1, 16 (Feb. 1, 1988).
91 Federal Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347.
" See Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1983). Joseph Stutts received a low
score on a General Aptitude Test Battery and was refused a job as a heavy equipment
operator for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Doctors said his low score was a result
of dyslexia and he could in fact do the job. TVA tried and failed to get other test results and
to relate them to its usual selection procedures. The court of appeals held that the agency
violated the Rehabilitation Act, holding that employers must accommodate their criteria to
the circumstances of handicapped individuals.
" But not aliens. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). But see Immigration
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must meet a demanding standard of business necessity 96 Other-
wise, the likelihood that a worker will become sick ought to be as
legally relevant as the prediction that he will be good at selling real
estate or will stay at this job after the employer has invested heav-
ily in training. But the society's willingness to spend money mak-
ing available job opportunities to a category denominated "handi-
capped" is also relevant, and since predicted future disease should
be regarded legally as a handicap (because the issue only matters
where the consequences of the prediction affect an important em-
ployment decision, and thus the prediction imposes a barrier be-
cause of the individual's current medical condition), employers
must make a reasonable accommodation to such individuals. We
must, however, bring ourselves to quantify or otherwise bound
what we mean by reasonable accommodation.
The consequence, at today's level of knowledge and disease,
would likely be protection for most job applicants subjected to ge-
netic testing (since the discounted value of their future disease
prospects would usually be within some reasonable accommodation
tolerance) and no protection for the person testing positive for the
AIDS virus (since that person's medical prognosis indicates a sub-
stantial chance that he or she will impose large costs very soon)."
III. FRINGE BENEFITS
The analysis above is incomplete. On one hand, antidis-
crimination laws such as the Rehabilitation Act forbid employers
from considering a wide range of criteria, including the likelihood
of future disease. On the other hand, developments in the area of
fringe benefits make it fiscally imperative that they consider those
very criteria. A New York case, State Division of Human Rights v.
Xerox,98 illustrates the trap into which employers have been
forced. In Xerox, the New York Court of Appeals held that New
Reform and Control Act of 1986, sec. 274B, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3374-80
(1986). Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (cited in note 89), declined to apply "differential impact" anal-
ysis to the Rehabilitation Act.
" Many issues that arise in the handicap discrimination context do have differential
impact. Presumably that is why Florida forbids employers from testing for the sickle cell
trait but does not forbid testing for other diseases. See Fla. Stat. Annot. sec. 448.075 (West
1981). Indeed, genetics is likely to establish percentage relationships between many diseases
and particular racial or national origin identifications.
97 Should the unprotected applicant be able to obtain a job by making an enforceable
contract to accept a smaller wage or to take the job without health insurance (or, for exam-
ple, without coverage for AIDS)? Government subsidization (pooling the risk at a larger
social unit than the employer) is discussed below.
98 65 N.Y.2d 213, 480 N.E.2d 695 (1985).
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York's Human Rights Law was violated when Xerox dismissed a
worker because of extreme obesity. 99 The court accepted the com-
pany's factual declaration that a grossly obese employee would be
more likely to be absent and more likely to become ill. But it said
she could not be dismissed on that account and seemed to say she
could not have been refused the job initially for that reason. Thus
Xerox is the leading determination that a person cannot be re-
fused employment on the grounds of a reasonably based prediction
of likely health costs.100
From the perspective of an employer's economic interests, a
worker is nothing but a factor of production. If that worker will
become ill, and if the employer will be responsible for the medical
costs as well as the output costs of the worker's absence, then the
predicted illness is nothing but a future dollar cost that the em-
ployer must consider and discount.10 The likelihood of illness is
just one of many relevant predictions about the applicant's future
ability to contribute to output.
But at least two types of concerns qualify that conclusion.
First, we properly hesitate to give employers the most intimate
knowledge about the medical futures of job applicants. Privacy is
an independent social value, reflected in various federal and state
laws and doctrines. 02 Should employers have access to blood,
11 Compare the attempt by the Veterans Administration to distinguish between "pri-
mary" alcoholism (misconduct because no underlying psychiatric disorder) and "secondary"
alcoholism (disorder). Only the latter justifies extension of the 10-year period (after military
service) for government-paid educational benefits. Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372
(1988). The statute, 38 U.S.C. sec. 1662(a)(1), makes some such line-drawing inevitable by
granting the extension of benefits eligibility only to veterans whose "physical or mental dis-
ability . . . was not the result of . . . [their] own willful misconduct." But why does the
Veterans Administration not deny extended benefits to cigarette smokers who contract lung
cancer or emphysema? See Traynor, 108 S. Ct. at 1391 (Blackmun, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
100 See also Matter of State Div. of Human Rights, 70 N.Y.2d 100, 510 N.E.2d 799
(1987), holding that New York City violated the state law when it refused a job as a police
officer because of fear that the applicant's spinal condition (spondylolisthesis) would lead to
future absences and benefit claims. Compare the new Massachusetts law, banning smokers
from jobs as state police officers. 22 Annot. Laws Mass. sec. 9A (Lawyers Co-Operative
1988). The attempt to predict lower-back problems, especially by the railroad industry, is a
major example of job selection to avoid later medical expenses. For the argument that this
endeavor, as carried out, has had a "negative social value," see Paul H. Rockey, Jane Fantel
and Gilbert Omenn, Discriminatory Aspects of Pre-employment Screening: Low-back X-ray
Examinations in the Railroad Industry, 5 Am. J. L. & Med. 197 (1979).
... Professor Stone calls this "a new medical status somewhere between health and dis-
ease-the status of being 'at risk' or 'hypersusceptible.' " Stone, 11 J. of Health Pol., Pol'y &
L. at 683 (cited in note 6).
10 See, for example, H.R. 3071, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. in 133 Cong. Rec. H6855 (July
30, 1987), sponsored by Rep. Waxman; and S. 1575, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. in 133 Cong. Rec.
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urine, and the raw material for psychological evaluations? 103
Should they be free to circulate this information inside the com-
pany? Should they pass it on in response to requests from other
employers or from insurance agencies? If they have the informa-
tion, do they hold it under a fiduciary duty to the applicant or
employee? Should an employer who learns from a blood test that
an applicant is AIDS-positive tell that applicant? Not tell him or
her? Tell the applicant's spouse or friends? These are difficult
questions on which legal rules are just beginning to evolve. 104 At
minimum, they counsel caution about unlimited authorization to
employers to make decisions based on predictions of an applicant's
medical future.
Second, our not entirely coherent commitment to mer-
itocracy-the opportunity for all, unconstrained by "irrelevant"
and socially disapproved barriers-is offended when a job is re-
fused because of medical prediction. We perceive a difference be-
tween a judgment about current capacity ("her score was lower on
a test of ability to pull a fire hose and climb a ladder"' 5) and a
prediction of the possibility of a future event. Or perhaps, since
what we see as current capacity is itself a prediction ("she will be a
good fire fighter as predicted by her score on the test"), we hold a
view that certain possibilities, even if accurately predicted, should
not influence current job opportunities. This is the important and
difficult issue of categorization. It is (apparently) acceptable to
group an applicant with all those who score between the 70th and
S11058 (July 31, 1987), sponsored by Senator Kennedy. Both bills would ban discrimination
against persons testing positive for the AIDS virus. The American Medical Association sup-
ports the bills. Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1744 (Aug. 1, 1987).
The non-discrimination provision would be waived if a health professional determined
there was a possibility of infecting others or if the person was unable to satisfy "bona fide
essential criteria" for the job. Regarding the duty to disclose a genetic diagnosis, see Pratt v.
U. of Minn. Affiliated Hospitals, 414 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1987).
See also Cronan v. New England Telephone, 1 Individual Employment Rights Cases
(BNA) 651 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1986), upholding a cause of action for breach of the
Massachusetts privacy statute when a supervisor allegedly told superiors that plaintiff suf-
fered from AIDS Related Complex.
Issues of workplace privacy and AIDS are discussed in Jana Howard Carey and Megan
M. Arthur, The Developing Law on AIDS in the Workplace, 46 Md. L. Rev. 284 (1987).
101 See Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., No. 843230 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct.
30, 1987) (described in Daily Labor Report (BNA), No. 212, A-2 (Nov. 4, 1987)), awarding
plaintiff $485,000 when she was dismissed for refusing to participate in a random drug test.
The jury found that the company violated her personal privacy and also its duty of good
faith and fair dealing; the damages were for infliction of emotional harm.
104 For interesting discussion of these issues in the British context, see Diana Brahams,
Aids and the Law, 137 New L.J. 749 (1987).
101 Berkman v. City of New York, 812 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1987).
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80th percentile on a test. Some of them will be excellent at the job,
but refusing all of them (and choosing those ranked in the top dec-
ile), if the test is the best measure we can afford to use, offends no
important value. But rejecting all blacks because race predicts un-
satisfactory performance, or all women because many will impose
the cost of pregnancy, are today forbidden categorizations. What
are the arguments for including future health prospects among the
forbidden criteria? Perhaps in our society the medical diagnosis
and treatment of disease has to a degree replaced religion (a sub-
stitute way to think about, deter, and respond to mortality). It is
bad enough that some will become sick. They should not be pun-
ished additionally by being grouped for purposes of job selection
with others who are also more likely than the average person to be
victims in the future. Whatever the reasons (and I admit I do not
have a good sense of them), American society seems to accept the
idea, and that acceptance will influence social arrangements.
Developments concerning so-called fringe benefits magnify the
relevance to employers of worker health and jeopardize the social
values embodied in handicap-discrimination legislation.106 Em-
ployer contributions toward employee medical expenses are little
more than fifty years old in the United States. Since World War II,
employer participation in medical insurance has grown dramati-
cally; and health insurance of some sort has become virtually the
defining feature of "primary labor market" jobs. In 1984 U.S. em-
ployers spent more than $154.5 billion for health costs of civilian
workers and dependents." 7 One important reason is that although
the U.S. enacted federal and state programs duplicating most of
,06 A related issue, needing a separate article, is the relationship between the fringe
benefit system and family responsibilities. As to some fringe benefits, the employer accepts
obligations for need-based payments to persons other than the employee. Often, medical
benefits are provided on behalf of a spouse and children. What about a live-in homosexual
partner? A cousin's child, "taken in" for humanitarian reasons? Child care is only the most
pressing current example of the attempt to assign to employers economic responsibility for
social needs that affect only some workers and only at certain stages of their working ca-
reers. The proposed federal pregnancy leave statute would permit leaves to care for an eld-
erly relative. Consider also possible employer responsibility for long-term care and hospice
care. The issue can be seen as one of redistributing total wages toward those who bear cer-
tain responsibilities or expenses. But expanded employer economic responsibilities of these
sorts create conflict with the view that employers have no proper concern with (and perhaps
no authority to know about) the private lives and living arrangements of employees.
107 See Diane M. Disney, The Development and Scope of Employment-Related Health
Protections, for the Ford Foundation, Project: Employer Benefits and the Future of the
Social Protection System, Florence Heller Graduate School, Brandeis University 64 (April
1987). The Chamber of Commerce estimated that in 1984 fringe benefits were 36.6% of total
payroll costs. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Employee Benefits Table 6-2 (1985). Id.
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the social welfare agenda of northern European countries, it failed
to create a program of national health insurance for non-poor citi-
zens of working age and their dependents. Instead, we provide sub-
stantial income tax advantages for employer provision of such in-
surance. It was therefore efficient for workers of adequate
income' 0 s to take part of their salary in tax-exempt employer pay-
ments to medical insurers.
Payment of medical expenses has become a major cost for em-
ployers. As former Secretary of Health and Human Services Jo-
seph Califano wryly observed, Chrysler Corporation pays more for
employee medical benefits than it pays for steel. 09 Payments on
behalf of current workers account for much of that cost. Another
large expense is payment toward medical costs of retirees.110 Com-
panies concerned about such expenses inevitably seek to impose
controls. The company that bears financial responsibility for the
most intimate details of an employee's life (abortion, pregnancy,"'
smoking, mental health care) will have financial incentives to
"manage" that employee's life. Thus two late twentieth century
trends collide: The expansion of principles of antidiscrimination
,08 Presumably there are three reasons why millions of low-wage workers do not have
medical insurance. First, if their income is low enough and their state offers Medicaid cover-
age for low-income workers, they and the employer benefit by placing this cost on state and
federal taxpayers. Second, low-income workers need cash so badly that they cannot divert
their small hourly salaries to protection against medical contingencies, and they, therefore,
must run the risk that service will be provided on a charitable basis or in some way eventu-
ally subsidized by taxpayers or by those who do have insurance. Third, since fringe benefits
are not credited against the minimum wage, employers paying wages at or near the legal
minimum cannot shift payments from salary to medical benefits.
See generally Joseph A. Califano, America's Health Care Revolution: Who Lives?
Who Dies? Who Pays? (1986).
"0 Joan Vogel, Until Death Do Us Part: Vesting of Retiree Insurance, 9 Indus. Rel. L.
J. 183 (1987). This cost is a large "time bomb" potentially affecting the balance sheets of
many large firms. The tax laws that require funding for future pension costs discourage
current funding for the health care expense of retirees. Yet companies are about to be re-
quired to show those expenses as a current liability. For one fascinating case showing the
significance of this issue in a bankruptcy proceeding see In re Century Brass Products, Inc.,
795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986).
. See H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. in 133 Cong. Rec. H528 (Feb. 3, 1987), intro-
duced by Rep. Patricia Schroeder, which would require unpaid pregnancy leave (at latest
report reduced in congressional negotiations from sixteen weeks to ten weeks but still the
subject of violently conflicting costs estimates from supporters and business opponents). Al-
bert R. Karr, Panel Clears Bill Giving Unpaid Leave from Work to New Parents, Seriously
Ill, Wall St. J. 12 (Nov. 18, 1987). Some of the discussion has included the question of
whether enactment of the law will lead companies to seek ways to avoid hiring female em-
ployees who are likely to become pregnant.
86 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1988:
and employee privacy, and the assignment to employers of finan-
cial responsibility for those private lives." 2
The risk is that employers will attempt to resolve their conflict
by choosing not to employ those whose private lives will result in
greater financial liability.118 To the extent that the employer's de-
cision not to hire is motivated primarily by the desire to avoid fi-
nancial/fringe benefit liability, it could be argued that plaintiffs
have an alternative to the Rehabilitation Act as a source of legal
redress: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA). ERISA is an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code
that offers certain tax incentives to companies that provide fringe
benefit programs to their employees. ERISA conditions the tax
benefits on operation of the programs in compliance with detailed
regulations. It seeks to assure that employers fulfill their promises
to employees regarding benefits by requiring, among other things,
full information, current funding, and accurate accounting.
There is language in Section 510 of ERISA"4 which suggests
relevance to the potential employee who has been denied a job be-
cause of possible future expense to the employer in the form of
higher health and life insurance costs or workers' compensation
premiums. Section 510 says:
"' Job mobility and marital instability present problems when the employer assumes
long-lasting obligations-e.g., for retiree health insurance. Commentators have observed the
irony of less permanent marriages and more permanent relationships with employers. See,
for example, Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 1 and 152-53
(1981).
Martin Rein, collaborating with Lisa Peattie, Lee Rainwater, and others, has explored
patterns of assigning the social protection function among families, employers, and govern-
ment. In each instance, the institution that accepts responsibility imposes duties and obliga-
tions. The institution also obtains information and (it can be asserted) infringes on privacy
and liberty. The right question may be the extent to which our liberty is curtailed by family,
by employer, by government or, almost inevitably, by some combination of all three. See
Lee Rainwater, Martin Rein, and Joseph Schwartz, Income Packaging in the Welfare State
(1986); Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, From Welfare State to Welfare Society: Some Un-
resolved Issues in Assessment (1981); Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, eds., Public/Private
Interplay in Social Protection: A Comparative Study (1986); and Lisa Peattie and Martin
Rein, Women's Claims: A Study in Political Economy (1983).
"3 With respect to AIDS, employers worry that new treatments may mean that pa-
tients live longer but cannot work and also that new drugs may be very expensive.
"I On Section 510 as usually applied-to protect current workers from employer ac-
tions intended to prevent them from taking advantage of benefit programs-see Joan Vogel,
Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section
510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1024, 1060-61 (1987). Of course
the ERISA bar to firing an employee who becomes a heavy burden on fringe benefit costs
may encourage employers to attempt to avoid hiring such workers. ERISA is unclear about
when an employer can terminate a benefit program because it is becoming too expensive.
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It shall be unlawful for any person to ...discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of any
employer benefit plan ... or for the purpose of interfer-
ing with.., any right to which such participant may be-
come entitled."'
"Discriminate against" and "may become entitled" suggest that
bringing suit under this section of ERISA would be the appropri-
ate form of redress for applicants whom employers reject due to
the future liability the applicants represent.1 6 This language, how-
ever, is misleading. ERISA does not say that American workers
must get pension, medical, or other benefits. (European statutes,
beginning with Bismarck's invention of the modern welfare state,
usually do so provide). ERISA makes no redistribution to low-wage
workers. 1 7 Rather, it offers various forms of federal protection to
better-off workers who have the bargaining power to obtain benefit
promises.
A survey of the appellate cases that interpret Section 510
reveals only suits brought by current or, most often, discharged
employees who lost their benefits or their jobs and now seek com-
pensation. In one leading case, the provision was the basis for a
large damages award against Marriott Corporation, when a jury
found that the company dismissed a manager because it learned he
had acquired multiple sclerosis and wished to avoid the health in-
surance consequences. 1 However, it is unlikely that Section 510
will be applied to discrimination against job applicants. The Sixth
Circuit found the purpose of Section 510, as revealed in its legisla-
tive history, to be "preventing unscrupulous employers from dis-
charging or harassing their employees in order to keep them from
obtaining vested pension rights." 1 9 The court concluded that the
"discrimination, to violate Section 510, must affect the individual's
employment relationship in some substantial way.' ' 2 0 Although
one might argue that refusing to hire someone affects that person's
employment relationship (before it begins), the preceding state-
29 U.S.C. sec. 1140 (1982).
116 But other language in the section-"participant or beneficiary" and "employee ben-
efit plan"-implies that the cause of action and subsequent relief are available only to the
individual who has already crossed the hiring hurdle. Id.
... But see the discrimination provisions in ERISA that protect lower-paid employees
against pension plan discrimination in favor of higher-paid workers. 26 U.S.C. sec. 410(b)(1).
..8 Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
"9 West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
,20 Id. at 245-46.
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ment of the purpose of this section of the Act belies such an inter-
pretation. Indeed the notion of an employment relationship itself
implies that the employee and employer have already made an ini-
tial connection and that they will continue to have contact in an
ongoing fashion.
In addition, the language in Section 510 about rights to which
participants may become entitled, as applied by the courts, does
not apply to the pre-employment discrimination context. Rather,
the distinction that courts have addressed is that between proba-
tionary or junior employees who have not yet qualified for benefits
and senior employees who have qualified for participation.121
Thus ERISA-so committed to protecting promised and "ac-
crued" benefits-is an unlikely vehicle for banning discrimination
against applicants who are predicted to become heavy users of the
benefit system.122 With the Rehabilitation Act and ERISA giving
ambiguous guidance, several states have enacted legislation re-
stricting employer discretion in hiring. Laws in Massachusetts and
Wisconsin say that an employer may not require an AIDS test as a
condition of employment. 12 3 California and Florida statutes pro-
hibit the use of such tests to determine an applicant's "suitability
for employment." 2 " The broadest statute appears to be that of
See Kross v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 701 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983); Garry v.
TRW, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 157, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (discussion of vested versus nonvested
retirement benefits with respect to current employees only).
12 The contrary argument would take this shape: ERISA requires no benefits. But if a
company decides to give benefits, it should not be able to pick and choose among new work-
ers according to whether they will use the benefits. Just as the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(k), said a company cannot have a disability benefit that
omits one disabling event-pregnancy-that occurs only in women, so ERISA (or some
amended ERISA) should tell employers that they must devise a benefit program that they
are willing to make available to all potential employees. The argument returns attention to
the issue that runs throughout this paper: Should we have a principle of non-discrimination
according to predicted future health? Is it wrong to have a benefit program for current
workers but then endeavor to choose employees who will not seek to use the program? The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, after all, came after a general commitment against discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex. We have not yet decided to ban discrimination in favor of the
now-and-future healthy.
On the political significance of the groupings that we permit insurance companies to
make, see Stone, The Disabled State (cited in note 27). See also Mark Scherzer, Insurance,
in Harlan L. Dalton and Scott Burris, eds., AIDS and the Law: A Guide for the Public 185
(1987), suggesting that if an AIDS test cannot be considered by a life insurer, those testing
positive will have an incentive to buy a large amount of insurance and at least leave a sub-
stantial estate. Scherzer raises the possibility of offering health insurance to those who test
positive at a higher premium.
... 111 Annot. Laws of Mass. sec. 70F (Lawyers Co-Operative Supp. 1988); and Wis.
Stat. Annot. sec. 103.15 (West Supp. 1987).
"' Annot. Cal. Health and Safety Code sec. 199.21(f) (West Supp. 1988); and Fla. Stat.
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New Jersey, which makes it unlawful to "refuse to hire or employ
or to bar or to discharge ... or to discriminate against [an] individ-
ual" on the basis of any "atypical hereditary cellular or blood
trait."' 25 As genetic explanations for human behavior multiply,
New Jersey's law will require definition. Does it prevent a decision
not to hire someone because of the individual's low intelligence?
Ironically, ERISA, along with other state and federal statutes
that encourage or mandate employer provision of health benefits
and thus increase the cost to employers of future illness, may actu-
ally create an incentive for employers to engage in discrimination
against those they were designed to protect. One difficulty with
banning certain types of discrimination is that employers look for
second-best ways to maximize profits. Massachusetts has banned
discrimination in worker selection on the basis of a positive test for
exposure to the AIDS virus. 26 At the close of its 1987 session the
Massachusetts legislature rejected legislation, supported by Gover-
nor Dukakis, to ban discrimination on the basis of sexual prefer-
ence. It is certainly not impossible that some employers, barred
from refusing applicants who test positive, instead will seek to
keep all gay men from their workforces. 27
IV. CONCLUSION
Government is accelerating the imminence of conflict between
our commitment to worker liberty and our desire to make employ-
ers pay for worker health expenses. On one hand, it enacts laws
expanding worker privacy and liberty, and telling employers to
back off. On the other hand, it imposes new responsibilities on em-
ployers for larger aspects of worker life. There is an anomaly, and
Annot. sec. 381.606(5) (West 1986). The Florida statute is broader, banning all "serologic"
tests. Laws in several southern states ban use by employers of a pre-employment screen for
the sickle cell trait. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Annot. sec. 448.075 (West 1981).
125 N.J. Stat. Annot. sec. 10:5-12a (West Supp. 1988).
121 See note 123 above.
127 This is discussed in Scherzer, Insurance (cited in note 122). Scherzer's conclusion is
that fear of the cost of AIDS will result in refusal of jobs to the smallest size unit on which
it is possible to get relevant facts and legally discriminate. If discrimination on the basis of
the AIDS test is banned, says Scherzer, employers will refuse jobs to gay males. If that is
banned, they may refuse jobs to males between 20 and 40. Scherzer found actual company
policies to refuse jobs to persons who have gained or lost 10 pounds in a recent period and
to persons who have worked as florists. Id. at 197. The National Institute of Insurance Com-
missioners, in 1986 guidelines, recommended that insurers be forbidden from asking if an
applicant is homosexual but permitted to test for AIDS. Seven states have adopted these
recommendations. James Kim, The Quandary of AIDS and Insurance, N.Y. Times sec. 4, 7
(Jan. 24, 1988).
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perhaps even an irresponsibility, in government decisions that as-
sert budgetary restraint while giving workers new benefits for
which employers must pay. 12 8 Congress shies from the budgetary
significance of national health insurance. 2 " It also fears (with
Medicare and Medicaid as its relevant history) that a government-
managed insurance program will have difficulty restricting costs. 30
It therefore considers mandating employer-paid insurance.' The
sponsors believe that incentives for employer cost control are a de-
sirable feature. But employer consciousness of costs entails em-
ployer concern for the medically-relevant details of employee char-
acteristics and employee life-styles. 32  The clash of goals is
329 I do not address here the question whether it is possible for Congress or a legisla-
ture, by imposing mandatory costs on an employer for employee benefits, to redistribute
total wealth from capital to labor. To some degree such redistribution may occur. What is
clear is that many elected law-makers have not wanted to describe their purposes in that
way and so may well choose methods that are inefficient or ineffective.
'29 Recent efforts to slow the rise in health care costs have had limited success. Health
expenses climbed from 9.1% of GNP in 1980 to 11.3% in 1987 and may exceed 13% in 1992.
Frank E. James, Medical Expenses Resist Controls and Keep Going One Way: Higher, Wall
St. J. 41 (Sept. 29, 1987).
13 See Roger Ricklefs, Firms Turn to "Case Management" to Bring Down Health-Care
Costs, Wall St. J. 21 (Dec. 30, 1987).
'"' Senator Kennedy's bill is S. 1265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. in 133 Cong. Rec. S7055
(May 21, 1987). It would require employers to provide a specified package of health insur-
ance to all employees who work 171A2 hours per week and to their "dependents." One esti-
mate of the cost is $1,000 per employee per year. Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1081 (May 23,
1987). Senator Kennedy's own cost estimate is 45 cents per hour as an "average cost... per
employee." Id. The point of this paper is that many job applicants are not "average." See
also the new Massachusetts law mandating employer-provided health insurance, Robin
Toner, Health Insurance and Political Hoopla, N.Y. Times sec. A, 16 (Apr. 22, 1988). One
difference between mandated protection for employees and a national program is coverage
for non-workers. The Kennedy and Dukakis approaches would continue the separation be-
tween the health-benefits situation of workers and the situation of those supported by in-
come-transfer programs. Social Security, our great example of an inclusive program holding
broad public support as it lifts millions above the poverty line, is the example rarely fol-
lowed in later programs. As one example of the need and the problem, consider the recent
study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute reporting that more than 500,000 women have ba-
bies each year without maternity insurance. Twenty-six percent of women of reproductive
age have no insurance coverage for maternity care. The average hospital bill for child-birth
is $4,300. The average cost of an extremely premature birth is $27,000. Study: 555,000 Preg-
nant Women Lack Insurance, Boston Globe 2 (Dec. 16, 1987).
132 One report says that 1% of employees account for 22% of health-care costs and
5.6% account for half of these costs. Ricklefs, Firms Turn to "Case Management," Wall St.
J. 21 (cited in note 130). As the significance of health-care costs rises, companies will inevi-
tably consider selecting workers so as to avoid the 1% or the 5.6%. Massachusetts, con-
cerned over the expense of benefits for police, fire, and corrections officers who became dis-
abled, has enacted a new law banning the hiring of smokers by local police and fire
departments. 41 Annot. Laws of Mass. sec. 101A (Lawyers Co-Operative Supp. 1988). (The
problem is that these workers automatically receive higher pension benefits if they have
heart and lung ailments.) A challenge under the federal Rehabilitation Act seems inevitable.
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inevitable.
It is not impossible to mediate these concerns. Imagine first a
discounted cashed-out calculation of health risk. AIDS-positive: X
dollars. Smoker: Y dollars. Genetically predicted likelihood of
schizophrenia: Z dollars. The employee could be told to pay that
price to get the job (with its medical insurance); or an income
transfer program could redistribute from those predicted healthy
to pay the extra costs. Alternatively, government could create a
secondary pool for persons posing substantial risk, so that employ-
ers would be able to transfer the excess risk of hiring them to a
broader population.133 As a specific example, imagine a program
assuming national responsibility for the medical costs resulting
from AIDS.1 " We can be sure that if costs are placed on employ-
ers, there will be real enforcement difficulties with the attempt
through law to coerce those employers to be uninfluenced in their
hiring decisions by the possibility the costs will arise.
The message of this paper is simple. Our systems for regulat-
ing the employment relationship and for providing social welfare
protections have become very complicated. As we consider such
major new steps as mandated employer-provided health insurance
and confront such dramatic new challenges as AIDS and genetic
Equally inevitable is similar decisions by other employers. Compare Coleman v. Casey Cty
Bd. of Ed., 510 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Ky. 1980), striking down under the Rehabilitation Act a
State Board of Education regulation banning persons who have had a leg amputated from
working as a school bus driver. On employer efforts to control cigarette smoking, see Roth-
stein, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 940 (cited in note 44).
"I Fifteen states have health insurance pools for high-risk consumers. Premiums are
very high. James Kim, The Quandary of AIDS and Insurance, N.Y. Times, sec. 4 at 7 (Jan.
24, 1988). Appropriate analogies include workers compensation "second injury" funds, auto
insurance assigned-risk pools, and Congressman Stark's legislation, H.R. 3441, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. in 133 Cong. Rec. H8307 (Oct.7, 1987). See also the discussion of state health
insurance pools for high-risk individuals, Robert Pear, States Act to Provide Health Care
Benefits to Uninsured People, N.Y. Times sec. 1, 1, 44 (Nov. 22, 1987). See Letter by
Charles Weller, Wall St. J. 31 (Nov. 19, 1987), asserting that the "medically uninsurable"
group might be 1 percent of the U.S. population, and if their expenses are $16,000 per year,
the cost of the Stark program would be $40 billion. The correct reply is that if so this is a
current cost to U.S. society, and thus the only question is how to allocate the cost. The
Stark proposal is very interesting. High-risk individuals would be assured coverage for no
more than 150% of "the average individual standard risk policy sold in the state for compa-
rable coverage." If the pool operated at a loss, which is likely if many persons presenting
high risks chose to enroll, costs would be assessed "equitably" to all employers in the state.
Thus this is a program for distributing among most workers the unusual risk of medical
benefits presented by some. And of course the sponsoring legislators can say they have not
raised taxes because the assessment on employers is not called a tax.
"I Two examples: The federal kidney dialysis program, 29 U.S.C. sec. 723(a)(4)(E), and
the black lung program for coal miners, 26 U.S.C. sec. 4121 (excise tax on coal industry),
and 26 U.S.C. sec. 9501 (trust fund for disabled miners).
92 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
predictions of future disease we should attend to the entire struc-
ture of our arrangements.
